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Summary
This article extends the normative analysis of public goods
and externalities to an international setting. The first part
considers the optimal allocation of a global public good.
Whether global production efficiency is desirable depends
on the existence of international lump sum transfers; in
the absence of such transfers and with an egalitarian social
welfare function a poor country should bear less of the
burden of producing global public goods than implied by
production efficiency. The second part of the paper analyzes
global externalities and shows that internationally uniform
Pigouvian taxation is only optimal in the presence of ideal
lump sum transfers.
Résumé
Cet article étend l’analyse normative des biens publics et des
externalités à un environnement international. La première
partie considère l’allocation optimale d’un bien public glo-
bal. Le caractère désirable de l’efficacité productive globale
dépend de l’existence de transferts forfaitaires internatio-
naux. En l’absence de ces transferts et avec une fonction
de bien-être, sociale égalitariste, le fardeau supporté par un
pays pauvre en raison de la production de biens publics
globaux devrait être moins lourd que celui impliqué par
∗. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). This paper was prepared for
presentation at the Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Marseille, 16-17 June 2006.
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l’efficacité productive. La seconde partie de l’article analyse
les externalités globales et montre qu’une imposition inter-
nationale uniforme à la Pigou ne peut être optimale qu’en
présence de transferts forfaitaires eux-mêmes optimaux.
Keywords: Public goods, externalities, normative analysis, interna-
tional setting.
Mots clés : Biens publics, externalités, analyse normative, environ-
nement international.
J.E.L. : D62, H41, H87.
Some time ago, when I was in a process of writing an article on public goods 1
for the second edition of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, I asked my
editor whether there would be a separate entry on “Global public goods”; if not,
I would like to include some material on this topic. He replied that there would
not in fact be a separate article, and that I was welcome to go ahead with my
plans. He then added that he had searched the electronic master list for all entries
and was amazed to see how many authors had introduced their articles by using
the word “global”. Interestingly, however, it turned out that in all these cases
“global” referred to analytical concepts like global curvature and global games, not
to global economic issues in the sense that I am using the word here. Perhaps this
is an indication that we economists - and public economists in particular – tend to
pay too little attention to problems that concern the world as a whole, and it is
with the hope of contributing to a more global perspective on our subject that I
have chosen this topic for my presentation 2.
Global public goods is of course not an entirely neglected topic in the recent
literature. E.g., there have recently come out two collections of articles (Kaul,
Grunberg and Stern 1999 and Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven and Mendoza 2003)
that look both at the theory, the empirical relevance and the implications for
economic policy. Another sign that the interest in the field is increasing is the fact
that it has been chosen as the theme of the 2007 Congress of the International
Institute of Public Finance.
1. This article will be a revision and extension of Sandmo (1987).
2. The text builds on and integrates material from two previous articles of mine (Sandmo, 2003,
2005).
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1. The Theoretical Basis
The obvious starting point for any application of the theory of public goods
is the original contribution by Paul Samuelson (1954, 1955). His classic papers
contain few explicit references to the jurisdictional framework in which decisions
about public goods provision are assumed to take place, but a natural interpre-
tation is that he primarily had in mind the nation-state. However, it is also a
reasonable assumption that he saw the theory as being applicable to several types
of jurisdictional frameworks. Such applications in later years have mainly been
in the area of local public goods and local public finance. Only recently has the
attention of economists been turned to goods that are public in regard not only to
the population of a particular country, but with respect to the world population as
a whole. The qualitative properties of the global environment offer perhaps the
most obvious examples of such goods, but there are many others. Knowledge is
an obvious and important example, while public health is another public good
with important international dimensions. At the institutional level, important
examples of global public goods are institutions required to promote world peace
and international security or to sustain the global market economy.
The Samuelson formulation is cast in the framework of welfare economics.
Starting from an individualistic welfare function, the aim of the analysis is to
characterize an optimal allocation of resources when social welfare is maximized
subject to a production possibility constraint. The most famous result to emerge
from the analysis is the “Samuelson rule”: The sum of the marginal rates of
substitution, taken over all consumers in society, between the public good in
question and some numéraire private good, must be equal to the marginal rate of
transformation in production. An alternative interpretation is that the aggregate
marginal willingness to pay for the public good must equal its marginal cost of
production.
A central concern in the following discussion is the question of the validity of
the Samuelson rule in a global context. Is this the way that we should think about
the provision of global public goods? If not, what are the changes or modifications
that need to be introduced before the theory can be applied to this type of public
good? It will be shown that the most problematic part of the extension concerns
the desirability of production efficiency and the separation of equity and efficiency
conditions which play such important roles in Samuelson’s analysis.
Some of Samuelson’s examples of pure public goods were “an outdoor circus
or national defense” (Samuelson, 1955). Apart from their tongue-in-cheek nature,
these are examples where we are led to think of the goods being provided by
explicit choice of some well-defined decision maker, but for many public goods
this is a simplified picture. Whether we think of the natural or the cultural
économiepublique
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environment, it is clear that at any point in time these goods are partly determined
by exogenous forces; they are given by the laws of nature or by human activities
of the past. Their current and future availability is also determined by the actions
of a large number of consumers and producers. The effects of these actions are
sometimes negative, sometimes positive, and at least in the present context it is
natural to think of externalities as unintended effects of private actions on the
availability of public goods. There is accordingly a close connection between the
normative theories of public goods and externalities.
2. A Model of Resource Allocation:
Basic Assumptions
The notion of a social welfare function, so central to the Samuelson theory of
public goods, is viewed by many with a good deal of scepticism. This stems partly
from the Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951), partly from the criticism
by Buchanan 3 and others of the public choice school that the very notion of an
aggregate social welfare function is inconsistent with the values of a democratic
society. Although the scepticism would seem to apply a fortiori to the notion of
a global social welfare function, it will, nevertheless, be used below. I should
stress, therefore, that my use of this concept does not in any way deny the force of
the Arrow theorem. It is not meant to imply that there exists a political system
of global preference aggregation, nor that there is a benevolent global planner
who manages the world’s resources according to his ethical values. The role of
the social welfare function in the following is just to help us understand the
limited significance of social efficiency or Pareto optimality as the sole guide to
rational decisions. Thereby it also helps us to understand the dividing line between
efficiency considerations on the one hand and ethical judgements on the other.
For simplicity, I assume that the world can be thought of as having two
countries, one rich and one poor. The rich country consists of n consumers with
utility functions uiR, where i = 1, . . . ,n. Similarly, the m consumers of the poor
country have utility functions uiP . For further simplicity I assume that there is
just one private and one (global) public good, so that the utility functions can be
written as
uiR = uiR
(
xiR,g
)
(i = 1, . . . ,n) , and ujP = ujP
(
xjP ,g
)
(j = 1, . . . ,m) . (1)
Here xiR is the private good consumption of the i’th individual in the rich country,
and xjP has a corresponding interpretation. The global public good g enters into
3. A selection of Buchanan’s writings in this area is in Buchanan (1987).
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all utility functions, but the subjective valuations of the good may differ between
individuals. It is likely to differ between the average consumers in the rich and the
poor country, and also within the populations of the two countries.
The public good, as it is modeled here, is a pure public good in the Samuelson
sense. It is public both within and between the two countries. The enjoyment of
the good by citizen i in country R does not diminish its availability for citizen j
in country P. This type of public good is a polar case which allows us to focus
on the problem of global public goods in its purest form. However, there are
clearly a number of alternatives for theoretical modeling that have a higher claim
to descriptive realism. Greenhouse gas emissions may have effects on global
warming while at the same time causing air pollution in the country of origin;
reducing domestic emissions may therefore simultaneously contribute to a global
and a national public good. Moreover, since air pollution is mainly generated as a
by-product of the consumption and production of private goods, it may also be
treated as a case of private goods use with both national and international external
effects. The present focus on pure public goods is motivated, first, by the desire
to provide a direct extension of the Samuelson model to a global context, and,
second, to study the problem of incentives in a setting directly comparable to the
original formulation of the theory. The explicit analysis of externalities will be
considered below.
The social welfare function is
W =W
(
ulR, . . .unR;ulP , . . .umP
)
. (2)
Note that the maximum of the social welfare function (subject to the production
possibilities constraint) is necessarily also a global Pareto optimum. For if we have
an allocation where we can make one consumer, e.g. the poorest individual in the
poor country, better off without making anyone else worse off, the value of the
social welfare function must increase. Therefore, such an allocation cannot be a
welfare maximum.
The description of the production side of the economy proceeds in two steps.
On the one hand it is assumed that both countries devote some of their resources
to provide the global public good, and that the global provision is an increasing
function of the individual countries’ contributions. In general, this can be written
as
g = ϕ
(
gR,gP
)
. (3)
In the following I shall, for simplicity of exposition, use the more specific assump-
tion that
g = gR +gP . (3′)
The special assumption that the amount of global public good is equal to the sum
of the individual countries’ contributions is one that in this particular context must
économiepublique
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mainly be justified in terms of analytical simplicity, while it does not affect the
nature of the conclusions. More generally, however, it is reasonable to assume that
the different countries’ contributions may have a different degree of efficiency in
contributing to the global public good 4.
Each of the countries is constrained in its output of private and public goods
by technology and factor supplies, and these constraints can be written as
FR
(
xR,gR
)
= 0, and FP
(
xP ,gP
)
= 0. (4)
Here xR and xP are the aggregate quantities of private goods produced and con-
sumed in the rich and the poor country, respectively, so that
∑
i x
iR = xR and
∑
j x
jP =
x
P . Equations (4) give us, for each country, the maximum amount of contribution
to the global public good that can be achieved for any given amount of private
good consumption. Behind the efficiency frontier, which is assumed to have
the usual concavity properties, lie a number of assumptions about the efficient
allocation of factors of production among sub-sectors of the economy, but for
reasons of space these will not be discussed explicitly here. In order to facilitate
an intuitive interpretation of the results, in the following I will use the quasi-linear
forms 5
xR +CR
(
gR
)
–ωR = 0, and xP +CP
(
gP
)
–ωP = 0. (4′)
Here ωR and ωP are constants representing the resource limitations of the two
economies. The functions CR and CP are assumed to be continuous with positive
first and second derivatives. This ensures that the production possibility curves
have the usual properties. Moreover, the marginal rates of transformation, which
in general should be written as FRg /F
R
x and F
P
g /F
P
x now become simply C
R
g and
CPg . (Here and elsewhere subscripts will be used to denote partial derivatives in a
notation that should otherwise be self-explanatory.) The latter expressions have an
obvious interpretation as the marginal cost of producing the public good in terms
of the quantity of private goods foregone.
Formally, the main difference between the present formulation and the standard
one lies in the disaggregated treatment of the production side. It is obviously
reasonable to assume that factor supplies and technologies differ between rich
and poor countries, and even more reason than in a single-country analysis to be
explicit about the conditions for productive efficiency.
4. In theories of externalities and public goods several alternative assumptions have been explored
concerning the relationship between individual contributions and the aggregate outcome, of which the
case represented by (3’) is clearly a special although important one. Cornes and Sandler (1996), who
survey a number of alternative models, refer to the present case as that of a “summation technology”.
5. A similar form was used by Chichilnisky and Heal (1994).
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3. Production Efficiency
As a step towards solving the global welfare maximization problem it is
accordingly useful to examine the more limited issue of world production efficiency.
A global allocation of resources in this context can be said to be productively
efficient if, for some given total of the world’s consumption of private goods, the
provision of the global public good is at its maximum. This might seem to be
desirable in view of the wider objective of global welfare maximization, for in
the absence of production efficiency it would have been possible to reallocate the
world’s resources so as to have more of the public good without suffering a loss of
private goods output. Such a reallocation would have the potential to improve the
standard of living for all.
Formally, the problem of characterizing production efficiency can be written as
Maximize g subject to xR +xP = x0, (5)
where x0 is some given amount of world output or consumption of the private
good. Using equations (4’), production efficiency can be characterized by these
and the condition
CRg = C
P
g . (6)
This condition says simply that for global production efficiency to hold, the
marginal cost of public goods must be the same in rich and poor countries. In
other words, comparative advantage should be fully exploited. The country in
which factor endowments and technology make it cheaper to produce the public
good, should devote more resources to it.
The flavour of the production efficiency result is strongly reminiscent of a
classic insight from the Heckscher-Ohlin version of the theory of international
trade, where the exploitation of comparative advantage assures global production
efficiency 6. In that theory the next step is to show that free international trade
will establish relative producer prices that are uniform across countries. Since, in a
competitive equilibrium, these will be equated to the marginal rate of substitution
in each country, it follows that free trade will result in an efficient allocation of
production between countries. But international trade theory is almost exclusively
about trade in private goods. It is interesting to ask under what institutional
conditions a similar result can be expected to emerge in the context of public
goods, and this will be considered further below.
Is global production efficiency necessarily desirable? Welfare economics has
taught us to think that production efficiency is necessary for social welfare maxi-
6. This must be understood as relative to the assumption that factors of production are internationally
immobile.
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mization; if some outputs can be increased with no decrease of other outputs, it
must be possible to make it better for some consumers without making it worse
for others. But in an international context it is not clear that this argument can
be applied. Our interest in the efficiency problem (5) must ultimately derive from
the assumption that the whole of world output of the private good is available
to satisfy consumer needs in both countries; if, instead, national consumption
possibilities are constrained by national output, the present formulation of the
problem loses much of its appeal. These issues can only be clarified by embedding
the production efficiency problem in the wider framework of welfare maximization.
4. Global Welfare Maximization
We now consider the more general problem of global welfare maximization.
This will be conceived as the maximization of the social welfare function (2) subject
to the technological constraints (3’) and (4’). In addition, we need to specify the
connection between world consumption and world production. To begin with, we
assume simply that world consumption must equal world production, so that
∑
i
xiR +
∑
j
xjP = xR +xP . (7)
Solving this problem of constrained optimization we obtain the following three
sets of optimum conditions:
CRg = C
P
g ≡ Cg. (8)
∑
i
(
uiRg /u
iR
x
)
+
∑
j
(
u
jP
g /u
jP
x
)
= Cg. (9)
WiRu
iR
x =WjPu
jP
x . (i = l, . . . ,n; j = l, . . . ,m) (10)
Equation (8) is the condition for global production efficiency (6), restated here for
convenience. This condition ensures that the marginal cost of the public good – the
opportunity cost of public goods provision in terms of private goods output – is the
same in both countries, and this common value will be written as Cg. Equation (9)
is a direct generalization of the Samuelson efficiency condition for public goods:
The sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public and private good
– the sum of the corresponding sums for each of the countries – should be equal to
the global marginal rate of transformation. Another way to write this condition
is as the requirement that the marginal benefit-cost ratio – the ratio of marginal
benefits to marginal costs – should be equal to unity, i.e.
[∑
i(u
iR
g /u
iR
x ) +
∑
j(u
jP
g /u
jP
x )
]
Cg
= 1. (9′)
no 18-19 - 2006 / 1-2
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Finally, the set of equations (10) is a requirement that the social marginal utility of
private goods consumption be the same both for all consumers in each of the coun-
tries and across countries. Together, (8)-(10) constitute a complete characterization
of the conditions for an optimal world allocation of resources. While conditions
(8) and (9) are characterizations of efficiency or Pareto optimality, equations (10)
characterize the just or equitable distribution of resources between individuals.
At this point the generalization of the Samuelson analysis to an international
setting may seem straightforward. In particular, the condition for optimal provision
of public goods has the same form as in the original model, except for the splitting
up of the sum on the left-hand side into one sum for each country. At the level of
utopian thinking about world welfare, this may not be very surprising. However,
as indicated above, the results are based on the assumption that private goods
consumption in each of the two countries is only constrained by world output, not
by the level of output in the country itself. This may be too utopian to be helpful.
It is true that international trade allows countries to choose consumption patterns
outside their sets of production possibilities, but the assumption here is stronger
than that. Since the single private commodity x represents the aggregate of all
private consumption goods, national consumption can only differ from national
production in the case where there exist transfers of consumption or income
between countries, and it is this feature of the analysis that leads to the equity
conditions (10). In other words, the constraint (7) is equivalent to an assumption
of lump sum transfers not only within each country but also between countries,
and it is this assumption that allows the neat separation of efficiency and equity
considerations in the optimal solution. This is exactly similar to the Samuelson
analysis. Implicit in the formulation is also the requirement that the net revenue
from the transfers must be positive and equal to the resource cost of public goods
provision.
Transfers of this kind should not be ruled out as irrelevant and uninteresting.
The amount of foreign aid and development assistance is significant and could
be increased further; moreover, as will be discussed further below, some transfers
could be seen as payments for public goods supply. Nevertheless, it is also true that
most countries in the main have to rely on their own resources, and it is therefore
of obvious interest to examine the case where consumption in each of the two
countries is constrained by its own output. This assumption can be represented by
the two constraints ∑
i
xiR = xR,
∑
j
xjP = xP , (11)
and these should be compared with the single condition (7) for the previous case.
It must be emphasized that (11) does not imply that there is no international trade.
With the interpretation of the single private good as an aggregate of all goods, the
meaning of conditions (11) is therefore that the value of production must be equal
économiepublique
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to the value of consumption; in other words, trade must be balanced. By contrast,
assumption (7) allows for the value of consumption in a single country to be either
higher or lower than the value of production, and this can only happen through
international transfers. Thus, both (7) and (11) are consistent with an assumption
of free trade; the difference between them is that (11) rules out international
transfers. 7
How does this change of assumption affect the case for production efficiency?
First of all, it is worth emphasizing that the welfare case for national production
efficiency remains valid. If one assumes the possibility of national lump-sum
redistribution of income, it follows directly that the output of the private good
should be maximized for any given level of public good contribution. In other
words, national welfare can always be improved by moving from inside the
production possibility frontier to some point on it. 8 On the other hand, global
production efficiency is in general not desirable. It is easy to see why. Assume that
the two countries are initially in a situation where the marginal cost of the public
good differs between them. Suppose that it is found that the concern for global
production efficiency calls for the poor country to contribute more to the public
good and for the rich country to contribute less. The poor country must then
move along its production possibility frontier in the direction of less production
of the private good, while the rich country will produce more. On average then,
the poor country consumers must get less private goods consumption and the rich
country consumers must get more. This will involve a welfare loss, on the average,
for consumers in the poor country, and a corresponding gain to the rich country
consumers. If the latter could transfer some of their gains to the former, everyone
could gain, but it is precisely the inability to make these transfers that is implied
by assumption (11).
Formally, the condition for optimal supply of public goods in this case can be
written as ∑
i
(
uiRg /u
iR
x
)
CRg
+
∑
j
(
u
jP
g /u
jP
x
)
CPg
= 1. (12)
This equation should be compared with the corresponding equation (9’) for the
case when international transfers are possible; this says that the optimal provision
of the global public good implies that the marginal benefit-cost ratio for the world
as a whole must equal one. By contrast, (12) says that without transfers, it is the
sum of the national marginal benefit-cost ratios that should equal one. 9
7. The formulation is similar to that in models of international trade with one traded and one
non-traded good; for an exposition see e.g. Bruce and Purvis (1985), p. 814–817.
8. Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that under certain conditions the case for production
efficiency remains valid even when the only instruments for redistribution are distortionary taxes.
9. The derivation of equation (12) is shown in Sandmo (2003).
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While (9’) represents an obvious extension of the theory of public goods to a
global context, the interpretation of (12) is less obvious. A country’s preferences for
the global public good should count for more in the evaluation of global benefits,
the lower is its marginal cost of producing the good; in this way, the aggregation
of preferences across countries takes some account of production efficiency, which
is intuitively reasonable.
But a puzzling feature of condition (12) is the apparent absence of welfare
weights. Since there is no equalization of the social marginal utility of consumption
between the rich and poor countries, one would expect the benefits to be weighted
by terms that reflect the distributional preferences embedded in the social welfare
function. Recall that we have assumed that there are perfect lump-sum transfers
within but not between countries 10. Consequently, the social marginal utility of
consumption will be the same for all consumers in the poor country, and also
between all consumers of the rich society. Formally, this can be written as
WiRu
iR
x = γ
R, WjPu
jP
x = γ
P , (i = 1, . . . ,n; j = 1, . . . ,m) (13)
where γR and γP are the common social marginal utilities of income for each of the
two countries. From (12) the relative weight on the poor country’s preferences is
CRg /C
P
g . But from the solution to the optimization problem it can be shown that this
is in fact equal to γP/γR, so that (12) has an alternative interpretation in terms of
welfare weights. If the global welfare function has an egalitarian form, γP/γR > 1,
and more weight is attached to the preferences of the poor population in deciding
on the optimal provision of the global public good.
The connection between cost weights and welfare weights has an intuitive
economic explanation. If the social welfare function has an egalitarian bias, so that
more weight is attached to private goods consumption in the poor country, one
would like it to contribute less to the global public good. But since the marginal
cost of providing the public good is increasing, this implies that the marginal cost
in the poor country must, in an egalitarian optimum, be low compared to that of
the rich country. The poor country should therefore devote less resources to global
public goods than indicated by considerations of comparative advantage.
An interesting question is whether the optimum without international transfers
would entail a higher or lower solution value for the public good than the optimum
solution when such transfers are possible. However, at the purely ‘technological’
level, abstracting from all incentive problems, no firm answer to this question can
be given. Intuitively, whether a greater weight on the benefits derived by the poor
country will increase or decrease the sum of marginal benefit-cost ratios, depends
10. This is obviously not a realistic assumption. Its use here should be seen as an attempt to capture
the idea that national redistribution policy is more highly developed than redistribution between
countries.
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on whether the poor country’s benefits are high or low compared to that of the
rich country.
A natural extension of the present analysis would be to the case where countries
must finance their expenditure on global public goods through distortionary taxes.
In that case, countries’ comparative advantage in the production of global public
goods would be based not only on differences in marginal production costs but also
on differences in the efficiency of their tax systems. However, such an extension
of the literature on the marginal cost of public funds to an international context
lies beyond the scope of the present paper and must be left for future research.
5. Global Externalities
A theoretical insight that was first clearly formulated by Pigou (1920) is
that market failure which is due to negative environmental externalities can
be ameliorated by an appropriately designed tax system whereby polluters are
confronted with a tax that leads them to internalize the social effects of their
own actions. When all polluters are faced with the same tax rate the system
will not only lead to an efficient balancing of costs and consumption benefits,
but also to production efficiency in the sense that the reduction in emissions is
achieved at a minimum of social costs. Although an efficient allocation can also
be achieved through alternative allocation systems, in particular by a system of
transferable quotas, Pigouvian taxes will serve well as an illustration of the issues
involved in extending the principles of environmental policy to an international
setting. The importance of this particular application of the theory is underlined by
recent concerns about the emission of greenhouse gases and its effects on global
warming 11.
The analytical model will in essence be the same as before; thus, we will
continue to assume that there exist perfect redistributive transfers within each
of the countries. The main change is that we have to assume that there are two
private goods instead of just one; without this extension we cannot handle the
issue of relative price changes. As before, there will be one public good which
now is in the nature of a “bad”, viz. global environmental pollution, e. The utility
functions can then be written as
uiR = uiR
(
xiR0 ,x
iR
1 ,e
)
(i = 1, . . . ,n) and ujP = ujP
(
x
jP
0 ,x
jP
1 ,e
)
(j = 1, . . . ,m) . (14)
Pollution is generated by the global output of commodity 1 according to the
simple relationship
e = xR1 +x
P
1 , (15)
11. For a recent survey of the main policy issues see Goulder and Pizer (2006).
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where xR1 and x
P
1 denote volumes of production in the two countries. This for-
mulation corresponds to equation (3’) in the public goods case. The production
constraints take the same quasi-linear form as above:
xR0 +C
R
(
xR1
)
–ωR = 0, and xP0 +C
P
(
xP1
)
–ωP = 0. (16)
In a competitive equilibrium in each of the two countries, taking commodity 0
as the numéraire, consumers will equate their “private” marginal rates of substitu-
tion (i.e., taking the state of the environment as given) to the consumer price of
commodity 1 (Q), while producers will set their marginal cost equal to the producer
price (q)
uiR1 /u
iR
0 = Q
R, (i = 1, . . . ,n) (17a)
CR1
(
yR1
)
= qR. (18a)
u
jP
1 /u
jP
0 = Q
P , (j = 1, . . . ,m) (17b)
CP1
(
yP1
)
= qP . (18b)
As before, there are two alternative sets of assumptions regarding the relationship
between production and consumption. There is no need to spell these out in detail,
since they correspond closely to the alternative assumptions (7) and (11). On the
one hand the individual countries’ consumption could be constrained only by
world output; this corresponds to the case of lump sum international transfers. On
the other hand, the consumption of each country could be constrained by the need
for balanced trade. In the first case, the optimal Pigouvian tax will be the same in
the rich and the poor country and be given by
t =

∑
i
(
uiRe /u
iR
0
)
+
∑
j
(
u
jP
e /u
jP
0
) . (19)
This is essentially the formula for the optimal Pigouvian tax under first-best
conditions (Sandmo, 2000), where the sum of marginal benefits is taken over all
consumers in the two countries. The tax induces the consumers to internalize
the benefits to the world community as a whole of a marginal reduction in
the consumption of the polluting commodity. It is therefore not surprising that
the measure of social benefits is the same as the Samuelson measure of the
benefits of public goods supply: A reduction in environmental pollution implies
an improvement of the global environment, which is a public good.
Alternatively, we now assume that there are no international transfers. A global
uniform tax will then no longer be optimal. The tax rates in the two countries will
be given by 12
tR =

∑
i
(
uiRe /u
iR
0
)
+
∑
j
(
u
jP
e /u
jP
0
) (
γP/γR
) , (20)
12. For the derivation of the optimal tax formulae see the Appendix to Sandmo (2005).
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and
tP =

∑
i
(
uiRe /u
iR
0
) (
γR/γP
)
+
∑
j
(
u
jP
e /u
jP
0
) . (21)
where the term γP/γR is the ratio of the social marginal utilities of income in the
two countries. These are equal between individuals within each of the countries
because of the assumption of domestic lump-sum redistribution; see equation (13)
above. We assume the global welfare function to be egalitarian, so that the weight
accorded to the marginal social damage for the rich country consumers will be less
than that of the consumers in the poor country; this implies that γP/γR > 1.
Comparing (20) with (21), we see immediately that
tR = tP(γP/γR), (22)
which implies that tR > tP: The optimal tax in the rich country is higher than in
the poor country. We may think of the ratio of welfare weights as expressing
the degree of egalitarianism embedded in the global social welfare function. In
the limit, as the ratio γR/γP approaches zero, giving lexicographic priority to the
welfare of the poor country, the tax in the poor country goes to zero, and the
whole burden of discouraging global pollution falls on the tax policy of the rich
country 13.
6. Problems of Implementation:
The Evaluation and Revelation of Benefits
Suppose that the governments of each country have found a way to estimate
national benefits from global public goods, including the global environment.
This means that they have overcome the difficulties that stem from individuals’
private incentives to misrepresent their benefits in order to avoid paying for public
goods 14. The next step is now to arrive at a measure of global benefits. If we
envisage the governments of the world negotiating about an environmental treaty,
each of them finds itself in a situation which in terms of strategic considerations
is similar to that of a single individual with respect to the national government.
Within the international community of nations most countries are small compared
to the world as a whole. By underreporting its aggregate willingness to pay a
country may conceivable reduce the amount that it will actually have to contribute
13. Issues of efficiency in international taxation have been examined in Keen and Wildasin (2004),
but their focus is not on externalities and corrective taxes.
14. For surveys of methods of benefits assessment see Cropper and Oates (1992) or Sandmo (2000,
ch. 4).
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to the global public good without influencing the global provision of such goods
appreciably. But if all countries reason along similar lines, the result will be
under-provision of global public goods.
How serious is this international free rider problem? Again a crucial consid-
eration is the availability of policy instruments for international redistribution.
Consider first the condition (9’) for optimal provision with unrestricted international
transfers. If this condition is not satisfied, it is in principle possible to improve the
situation for all countries through a combination of public goods adjustment and
international transfers. One could envisage a system of international bargaining
that would make it possible to convert a situation characterized by potential Pareto
improvement to one of actual improvement, provided that the transfer mechanisms
were sufficiently fine-tuned and flexible. This would not eliminate the incentive
problems; individual countries might still find it in their own interest to report
high costs and low benefits in order to increase their net gains from international
transfers. Still, the combination of contributions to global public goods provision
and income transfers would increase the possibility of achieving a global optimum,
compared to the case with no transfers.
The latter case can be understood by considering condition (12), which gener-
alizes easily to an arbitrary number of countries. In the absence of international
transfers the marginal benefit-cost ratios should sum to unity. But this means
that at the global optimum each individual country’s ratio must be less than one.
In other words, since a part of the benefits generated by the country in question
accrues to other countries, each of them will be asked to contribute beyond the
point where its marginal benefit-cost ratio equals one. Suppose that each country
considers only its own welfare. If marginal benefit-cost ratios decline with the
amount of public goods available, which is a reasonable assumption 15, no country
would voluntarily use resources for global public goods beyond the point where its
national benefit-cost ratio equals unity, but this would imply that the sum of these
ratios would be of the order of the number of countries in the world, indicating a
severe under-provision of global public goods.
We must conclude, therefore, that whatever the difficulties are of achieving
efficient and equitable provision of global public goods in combination with
international transfers of income, the difficulties become magnified in the absence
of such transfers 16.
Some modifications may be in order. The assumption that economic agents
15. This follows if marginal benefits decline and marginal costs increase with the level of provision.
16. The combination of anti-pollution measures with international transfers has been discussed in
a number of contributions to the literature on transfrontier pollution. For a theoretical analysis see
Chander and Tulkens (1992). Mäler (1991) discusses the problem of practical implementation with
numerical illustrations for the case of sulphur emissions in Europe.
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always take a narrow view of their own self-interest when considering the alloca-
tion of resources to public goods, is hardly realistic. Even for single individuals in
large economies we observe that people voluntarily donate time and money for
the purpose of providing public goods. The increased concern for the environment
in public policy has to a large extent been influenced by voluntary organizations
that have been acting as pressure groups. Many individuals, obviously, do not
see themselves as unable to influence aggregate outcomes like the allocation of
resources to public goods or the design of policies to modify the effects of un-
regulated private actions. What is true for the single individual in the national
economy is also likely to be true for a single country in the community of nations,
particularly so since a number of countries are actually quite large relative to the
world as a whole. One might therefore expect that, at least to some extent, they
might be able to internalize the effects of their own actions on the state of the
global environment 17.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown how the theories of public goods and externalities
can be generalized to an international setting where countries contribute to the
provision of global public goods or to environmental deterioration. At one level of
discourse, the generalization is straightforward. Under the assumption of global
welfare maximization the Samuelson optimality rule for public goods and the
Pigouvian tax principles remain valid in a global setting. However, some of the
assumptions required for the results to hold are distinctly less attractive in an
international setting than is the case in the context of the nation state. The crucial
one among these is the availability of individualized lump sum transfers. The
political feasibility of such transfers is hardly a realistic option even within the
context of the nation state, and in an international context it is even more doubtful.
Nevertheless, this polar case is interesting in showing the precise conditions under
which the standard optimality conditions are valid in an international context.
In order to demonstrate the crucial role of international transfers, we have
assumed that, as an alternative, lump sum transfers are indeed feasible within
the nation state, but that they are non-existent between states. In that case the
optimality conditions are altered. First, global production efficiency is no longer
desirable; in the interests of equity, poor countries might not be required to
contribute as much to global public goods as their comparative advantage would
otherwise call for. Second, the optimality condition for public goods provision
17. For a more detailed discussion of the incentive structures for global public goods provision, see
Barrett (2001, 2003).
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changes to the requirement that the sum of the national marginal benefit-cost
ratios should be equal to one. This condition brings to light an important incentive
problem for the global economy, since each nation state finds itself in a strategic
situation similar to that of the single individual in the nation state. To ensure the
maximal gain to the world as a whole, each country must contribute to a point
which, at least at the margin, involves a loss to itself. A similar insight holds for
the case of externalities: In the absence of international lump sum transfers, with
an egalitarian social welfare function the environmental benefits accruing to the
consumers in the poor country should count more heavily in the assessment of
global benefits. Also, the Pigouvian tax rate should be lower in the poor country
than in the rich.
The two model alternatives – unrestricted lump sum international transfers
versus no transfers at all – are obviously theoretical polar cases of international
income redistribution. The more general conclusion that can be drawn from
the analysis is that the incentive problem is easier to overcome when decisions
concerning global public goods and externalities are combined with a policy of
international transfers. Indeed, in the context of rich and poor countries, a policy
whereby efficiency calls for extensive provision of global public goods by poor
countries (e.g. preservation of the rain forest or of tropical bio-diversity) would be
easier to implement if combined with a policy of redistribution. The transfers could
in principle be designed in such a way that the overall gains from the provision of
global public goods could be distributed among countries to ensure a positive gain
for all.
An interesting perspective on transfers of this kind is to see them as payments
for services rendered to the rich countries. The rich countries derive benefits from
the poor countries’ provision of global public goods (including environmental
improvement), and if the poor countries do in fact have a comparative advantage
in the production of such goods, the rich countries can “buy” those goods cheaper
abroad than at home. Thus, there are possible gains from trade here, but it
must be kept in mind that to realize the gains one must somehow overcome the
incentive problems that are inherent and inescapable in all problems of public goods
allocation. Rich countries can obtain more worldwide bio-diversity – presumably
a global public good – by paying poor countries to spend more resources on
protecting endangered species. But a single rich country is nevertheless exposed to
the free rider incentive to let other rich countries foot the bill.
For transfers of income to play the role envisaged here, they must be designed in
a way that is rather different from current systems of foreign aid. Economists have
sometimes argued in favour of non-conditional aid as the best way to overcome
international inequality, and this would be consistent with the implications of the
first version of our theoretical model. But in the context of a more restricted and
practical role for income transfers, they ought rather to be designed so as to make
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them conditional on contributions to the provision of global public goods.
The main difference between public goods provision in the nation state and the
global economy lies in the link with tax payments. Two differences of principle
are of crucial importance. The first is that, in the nation state, a tax-financed
increase in public goods could pass the benefit-cost test without providing gains
to each and every citizen. This is because the nation state has instruments of
enforcement by which it can extract payments also from those citizens who are
not net beneficiaries from the policy, while the world community of sovereign
nations does not possess policy instruments of this kind. In the global community
participation in the policy must therefore be based on voluntary participation, so
that it becomes important to develop policy tools that distribute the gains to all
participating nations. The second difference lies in the possibilities of developing
credible systems of enforcement. Even when all countries gain from the policies,
individual countries would have an incentive to engage in various activities –
such as misrepresentation of benefits or costs, evasion or avoidance of taxes or
quotas – that would increase their net share of the global gains further. A viable
system of global public goods provision must to some extent be based on countries’
acceptance of a notion of global welfare that goes beyond national self-interest.
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